Two Years of Prabowo: Assessing Progress, Not Just Accumulating Challenges
The first two years of an administration provide a reasonable basis for assessing its policy direction, although they may not be sufficient to measure all its structural impacts. In this context, Channel NewsAsia’s (CNA) report on President Prabowo Subianto, published on 20 October 2026, raises several important questions concerning fiscal sustainability, the quality of economic growth, and political consolidation ahead of the 2029 general election. These questions deserve serious consideration. However, a comprehensive assessment must go beyond simply compiling a list of risks. It must distinguish between problems that have been empirically established, policy consequences that are still unfolding, and concerns about the future that have yet to be fully substantiated.
The challenges facing a government do not disappear simply because its policies have well-intentioned objectives. Conversely, the existence of challenges is not sufficient grounds for dismissing the progress that has been achieved. An assessment of Prabowo’s first two years should therefore be guided by more fundamental questions: Have policy choices produced measurable changes? Have their benefits been distributed equitably? And can these outcomes be sustained without compromising economic stability or the quality of democracy?
Economic Growth Is More Than a Number, but It Is Not an Illusion
One of the issues highlighted by CNA is the sustainability of Indonesia’s economic growth. The report cites economic growth of 5.45 per cent in the first half of 2026 and draws attention to the substantial contribution of government expenditure to economic expansion. Concerns about excessive dependence on public spending are legitimate, particularly as the government seeks to achieve its annual growth target of 8 per cent. However, a substantial contribution from government spending does not, in itself, indicate that economic growth is unhealthy. Under certain conditions, public expenditure can sustain domestic demand, strengthen essential public services, and create markets for business activity.
Data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) provide additional context. Indonesia’s economy grew by 5.11 per cent in 2025, up from 5.03 per cent in 2024. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Investment and Downstream Industry, through the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), recorded realised investment of IDR 1,931.2 trillion in 2025, an increase of 12.7 per cent from the previous year. This investment was also associated with the creation of 2.71 million jobs (BPS, 2026; BKPM, 2026). These figures do not establish that all economic sectors have developed evenly. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that Indonesia’s economic performance cannot be reduced to a narrative of dependence on government spending alone.
The real challenge lies in transitioning from demand-driven growth to growth underpinned by productivity. The government must ensure that public expenditure creates opportunities for private investment, improves economic infrastructure, strengthens workforce skills, and increases industrial value added. If government spending merely boosts consumption without generating productivity gains, economic growth will eventually encounter structural limits. Conversely, when public expenditure enhances productive capacity and human capital, it can serve as a bridge towards more sustainable growth.
The 8 per cent growth target should therefore be treated as a transformation objective, rather than a figure that must be achieved through unlimited spending expansion. Success should also be measured not merely by increases in gross domestic product, but by improvements in labour productivity, job quality, productive investment, household real incomes, and the competitiveness of domestic industries.
Fiscal Discipline and the Willingness to Invest in People
Criticism of the government’s social welfare programmes, particularly the Free Nutritious Meals (Makan Bergizi Gratis, or MBG) programme and the proposed abolition of tuition fees at public universities, touches on a fundamental issue in public policy: how the state determines its priorities when resources are limited. CNA emphasises the substantial budgetary requirements of these programmes and the risks that may arise if the government expands its spending commitments without strengthening its revenue base.
These concerns should not be dismissed. Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance recorded a 2025 state budget deficit of IDR 695.1 trillion, equivalent to 2.92 per cent of GDP, while the primary balance registered a deficit of IDR 180.7 trillion (Ministry of Finance, 2026). Although the government remained within the applicable fiscal deficit limit, this situation demands caution. Fiscal space is not an unlimited resource. Every additional spending commitment must be accompanied by a clear assessment of its financing sources, expected benefits, and implications for other development programmes.
However, fiscal discipline is not synonymous with automatically cutting social expenditure. The state must also consider the economic costs of malnutrition, unequal access to education, and inadequate human capital. Well-designed social spending can constitute a productive investment, particularly when its benefits improve learning outcomes, health, labour force participation, and future productivity.
This is where the government must demonstrate the distinction between programmes that are politically popular and those that are genuinely effective. The MBG programme, for example, should not be evaluated solely on the number of beneficiaries or meals distributed. The government must demonstrate the quality of nutritional provision, food safety, targeting accuracy, effects on nutritional status, and economic benefits for farmers, livestock producers, fishers, and small businesses. Even a programme with extensive coverage can encounter serious problems if oversight is weak or its benefits fail to justify its costs.
The same principle applies to higher education. The proposed abolition of tuition fees must be assessed in terms of students’ needs, fiscal capacity, equitable access, and universities’ ability to maintain educational quality. The policy need not be framed as an unavoidable trade-off against the MBG programme, as though the state can support only one of the two. A more productive question is how the government can establish phased priorities, identify those most in need, and allocate funding according to evidence of effectiveness.
The success of social policy, therefore, should not be measured by the volume of budget expenditure absorbed or the scale of programmes announced. It should be measured by the net benefits received by society relative to fiscal costs and opportunity costs. Such an approach would allow the government to maintain its ambition to develop human capital without neglecting fiscal prudence.
Food Security: Higher Production Does Not Mean the Job Is Finished
Progress in the food sector must also be assessed from two perspectives simultaneously. The government has legitimate reasons to prioritise increased production and reduced dependence on imports as strategic objectives. Food security is not merely an economic issue; it also concerns social stability, national resilience, and the state’s capacity to withstand disruptions to global supply chains.
BPS data indicate that rice production for consumption reached 34.69 million tonnes in 2025, an increase of 13.29 per cent compared with 2024 (BPS, 2026). This represents a significant development on the production side. However, higher production does not automatically guarantee affordable prices for every household, efficient distribution, or resilience against drought and climate-related disruptions. Gains in production must translate into stable availability, reasonable prices, adequate reserves, and equitable access to food.
Claims of food self-sufficiency must therefore be assessed against clearly defined criteria and measurement periods. Domestic production, consumption requirements, changes in stocks, imports for specific purposes, and price stability are distinct indicators. Combining them into a single claim without adequate explanation can produce excessive optimism, just as disregarding increases in production can lead to disproportionate pessimism.
A more prudent approach is to acknowledge progress in production while maintaining scrutiny of distribution systems, agricultural productivity, farmers’ welfare, and climate resilience. Genuine food self-sufficiency is not simply the ability to produce more rice in a given year. It is the capacity to ensure affordable and sustainable access to food as economic and environmental conditions change.
Political Stability Must Deliver Effective Governance
CNA also highlights cabinet reshuffles, the cohesion of the governing coalition, and the possibility of changing political calculations ahead of the 2029 general election. In a multiparty political system, such developments are not unusual. Governing coalitions can evolve in response to party interests, performance assessments, and shifts in public support. A cabinet reshuffle can serve as an instrument of policy correction, but it can also create uncertainty if the government fails to explain its objectives and performance indicators.
The central question, therefore, is not whether the President replaces ministers, but whether those changes improve the government’s capacity to govern. Ministerial appointments and dismissals should be assessed according to programme continuity, the quality of interministerial coordination, the ability to resolve bureaucratic obstacles, and progress towards verifiable targets. Without such criteria, political analysis risks becoming overly dependent on speculation about elite motivations while paying insufficient attention to actual governance outcomes.
Similarly, the breadth of a governing coalition cannot automatically be taken as evidence of robust political stability. A large coalition can facilitate decision-making, but it may also weaken oversight if the imperative of preserving power takes precedence over parliament’s scrutiny function. Conversely, disagreements among political parties do not necessarily indicate a crisis. In a democracy, political differences can provide a mechanism for correction, provided they operate within constitutional rules and legitimate institutions.
The more important measure is whether the government remains open to criticism, explains the rationale behind its policies, and demonstrates a willingness to revise ineffective programmes. Political stability has value when it enables the state to implement policies consistently, not when it merely suppresses disagreement. A strong government is not one that operates without criticism, but one that can use criticism to improve the quality of its decisions.
From Pessimistic Assessments to Evidence-Based Accountability
Coverage of Prabowo’s first two years in office raises substantive concerns, ranging from fiscal space to the effectiveness of political consolidation. Nevertheless, the administration’s overall performance cannot be assessed solely through a catalogue of risks. Data on economic growth, investment, poverty reduction, and increased rice production point to developments that deserve consideration. At the same time, a budget deficit approaching the applicable fiscal ceiling, disparities in poverty between rural and urban areas, and the need to demonstrate tangible results from social programmes indicate that the government still has considerable work to do.
There is no reason to turn every criticism into a defence of the government. Equally, there is insufficient justification for turning every risk into a conclusion that the policy direction has failed. Both approaches diminish the quality of public assessment because they place conclusions ahead of a comprehensive examination of the evidence.
As the administration enters its third year, the most important task is to convert initial achievements into measurable and sustainable outcomes. The government needs to strengthen its revenue base, maintain budgetary discipline, improve productivity, ensure that social programmes deliver tangible benefits, and preserve democratic oversight mechanisms. Success cannot depend solely on the strength of its political mandate or the scale of the programmes it launches. It must be reflected in people’s quality of life, more equitable economic opportunities, and the ability of state institutions to function consistently.
Ultimately, Prabowo’s first two years should be understood as a period of evaluation that reveals both progress and limitations. Rational optimism does not mean believing that the government is certain to succeed. Rather, it means acknowledging demonstrable progress while correcting unresolved shortcomings. Likewise, meaningful criticism is not an exercise in accumulating as many weaknesses as possible. It is the ability to identify what is not working, explain why it is happening, and specify the changes needed to improve the situation.
Indonesia needs public scrutiny that does not become trapped between praise and pessimism. What the country needs is a consistent standard of assessment: acknowledge results when supported by data, question claims when the evidence remains insufficient, and demand corrective action when policies fail to deliver benefits commensurate with their costs. Under such a standard, criticism retains its analytical edge, while optimism remains grounded in empirical evidence.
One final question, CNA: Does your analysis also account for the revenue leakage associated with under-invoicing that has persisted for more than three decades? Should this long-standing structural problem not form part of the assessment of Indonesia’s fiscal capacity and economic governance?
